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FAMILY PLANNING AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE POOR
GEORGE M. SIRILLA, S.J. *
Introduction
T HE 89th CONGRESS will long be remembered for its numerous
and progressive enactments aimed at carrying out President
Johnson's "Great Society" programs to help the poor and disadvan-
taged of this country enter into the mainstream of American life and
make their own contributions to it. One of the proposed bills
considered, though not enacted by this Congress, and at least partially
contemplating the poor as its beneficiaries, was a bill that was
criticized for the reason, among others, that in its administration it
would infringe the rights of the poor. This bill was S. 1676,
submitted by Senator Gruening of Alaska on April 1, 1965, and
directed at population problems in this country and in the world.
In testifying on this bill before Senator Gruening's subcommittee,
on August 24, 1965, Mr. William B. Ball, representing the Pennsylvania
Catholic Conference, stated that it was "plainly and simply, a bill for the
establishing of a domestic and international birth control program," 1 and
that "the public power and public funds should not be used for the
providing of birth control services."' 2 He stated his belief that "if the
power and prestige of government is placed behind programs aimed
at providing birth control services to the poor, coercion necessarily
results and violations of human privacy become inevitable."
* B.M.E. (1952) Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; LL.B. (1956), Georgetown
University.
1Hearings on S. 1676 Before a Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1300 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
2 Ibid.
3Id. at 1300-01.
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Earlier on the same day, Dexter L.
Hanley, S.J., also testified on S. 1676
before Senator Gruening's subcommittee.
Fr. Hanley's testimony likewise recognized
the important rights of the poor that
must be considered in programs of this
type, but he concluded that if these rights
are properly protected (and he felt they
could be properly protected), and if cer-
tain other conditions are satisfied, the
government could properly act in the
area of family planning, with the sup-
port of Catholics, and public funds
could be used for this purpose. The
testimony of Fr. Hanley and Mr. Ball
have been previously considered and re-
viewed by this writer,4 and Mr. Ball has
replied to that review.5
On November 14, 1966, the National
Catholic Welfare Conference, with the
unanimous approval of the United States
Bishops assembled for their meeting in
Washington, issued a statement on govern-
ment and birth control. This statement,
referred to hereafter as the "Bishops'
Statement," has been criticized for alleg-
ing that there are government activities
seeking to coerce the underprivileged to
practice birth control and invading their
rights of human privacy in the intimate
details of married life.6
In this paper, the "Bishops' State-
ment" will be considered along with a
4 Sirilla, Government Policy and Family Plan-
ning, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 203 (1966).
5 Ball, Government Birth Control: Reply To
Mr. Sirilla, S.J., 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 216 (1966).
6 Reston, Washington: The Catholic Bishops on
Birth Control, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966,
§ 4, p.12E; Bishops and Birth, The New
Republic, Dec. 3, 1966, p.4. Statement of
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., to the Catholic Phy-
sicians Guild of Houston, appearing in The
National Catholic Reporter, Nov. 30, 1966, p.1,
re-examination of Mr. Ball's coercion-
privacy theory insofar as domestic pro-
grams are involved, and comments will
be offered in response to the reply of
Mr. Ball to my earlier article. In ad-
dition, state and federal activity in family-
planning programs will be examined.
While family-planning programs sup-
ported by the federal government may be
argued to be extendable to all and not just
the poor, for example, on the ground
of being a legitimate concern of the
federal government, I will be concerned,
in this paper, mainly with the rights of
the poor and underprivileged. Refer-
ence will be made to the question of
whether or not the poor have the right,
and not just the privilege, to receive
public assistance in matters essential to
their existence and well-being, as was
mentioned in my earlier article in refer-
ence to the question of whether or not
the poor may have a right to receive
public assistance as to matters of family
planning. This latter question did not
receive any particular attention either in
the "Bishops' Statement" or in Mr. Ball's
position.
Evidently, there would also be moral
questions for Catholics regarding the types
of public family planning programs to
which they could give their support and
cooperation. Such moral questions have
been referred to elsewhere 7 and, will not
be discussed herein. They were not
treated in any detail either in the "Bish-
ops' Statement" or in Mr. Ball's testi-
mony. It will be understood, however,
that they would have to be specifically
7 Hanley, The Catholic and Population Policy,
12 CATHOLIc LAW. 330-37 (1966). See also
Sirilla, supra note 4, at 210, 211, 214-15.
considered in any comprehensive analysis
of the position Catholics should or may
take regarding particular proposals.
The Bishops' Statement
While recognizing that the state has a
role in fostering conditions in modem
society which will help the family achieve
the fullness of its life, the "Bishops'
Statement" admits a major preoccupation
with the freedom of spouses to determine
the size of their families. For much of
the rest of the statement, the problems of
coercion of the right of free choice as to
family size, and of invasions of the right
of human privacy in intimate matters of
married life are referred to in one way
or another in connection with federal
and state welfare programs for the poor.
That these are important and fundamental
human rights seems beyond question.
Likewise, combining birth-control or
family-planning programs directly with
welfare department programs of economic
assistance poses a serious threat to these
rights for those who are on welfare or
public assistance, and for that reason
should be avoided. Thus, the remark in
the "Bishops' Statement" urging a clear
and unqualified separation of welfare as-
sistance from birth control in order to
safeguard the freedom of the person and
the autonomy of the family would logi-
cally follow from a concern for protecting
the rights under consideration.
The "Bishops' Statement" seems to
have been interpreted by some as oppos-
ing under any circumstances the use of
public funds to provide birth-control in-
formation and services.8 The remarks in
8 Reston, supra note 6.
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their statement which probably gave rise
to this interpretation are as follows:
It should be obvious that a full under-
standing of human worth, personal and
social, will not permit the nation to put
the public power behind the pressures
for a contraceptive way of life. . .
We call upon all-and especially Catho-
lics-to oppose, vigorously and by every
democratic means, those campaigns already
underway in some states and at the
national level toward the active promotion,
by tax-supported agencies, of birth pre-
vention as a public policy, above all in
connection with welfare benefit programs.
It should be noted, however, that these
remarks follow almost directly the allega-
tions that "government activities increas-
ingly seek aggressively to persuade and
even coerce the underprivileged to prac-
tice birth control," and that "intimate
details of personal, marital and family life
are suddenly becoming the province of
government officials in programs of assist-
ance to the poor." Thus, it is possible
to interpret this call for opposition to the
use of public funds for birth-control
purposes to be aimed only at presently
operating programs and only because the
statement alleges that these particular pro-
grams are administered so as to be co-
ercive and violative of the right of privacy,
and to promote "birth prevention as a
public policy, above all in connection
with welfare benefit programs."
Their stated objections, therefore, arise
from a concern for the rights of the poor,
and from a fear that government will
promote or is now promoting birth pre-
vention as a public policy. It would seem
to follow, then, that if publicly supported
family-planning programs could be set
up in this country, as by legislation, so
as properly to respect the rights of the
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poor, and so as not to promote birth pre-
vention or a contraceptive way of life
as a public policy, the objections in the
"Bishops' Statement" would not be ap-
plicable. For example, would it be pos-
sible to set up federally supported family-
planning programs, completely indepen-
dent of any welfare programs giving
economic assistance, and whose policy
regarding the poor would be to provide
the necessary education and services to
help them carry out their own freely
made decisions as to family size? This
policy could operate to help those who
freely choose to have children as well as
those who freely choose to limit family
size. In other words, it could also provide
assistance for the purpose of having
children to those couples who because of
some correctable and temporary difficulty
or problem have not been able to have
any children, and who are too poor or
uneducated to secure the proper attention
and services needed, on their own. As to
limiting family size, freedom of choice
as to method would also have to be pro-
vided. If such programs were feasible,
then in the words of the "Bishops' State-
ment" they would involve "a clear and
unqualified separation of welfare assist-
ance from birth control considerations"
wherein the federal government would
assume "a role of neutrality whereby it
neither penalizes nor promotes birth con-
trol."
Freedom from Coercion and
the Rights of the Poor
That the right of spouses to be free
from governmental coercion in their de-
cisions as to family size (large or small),
and method of carrying out those de-
cisions is of fundamental importance
cannot be denied.9 It has been previously
admitted by Fr. Hanley and this writer.
Thus, the charge in Mr. Ball's reply to
my article that Fr. Hanley "saw the
Catholic moral teaching on contraception
as the sole issue involved" 10 and that he
"touched upon the problem of govern-
mental coercion and of free choice, but
solely in terms of governmental
coercion of the Catholic conscience, free
choice for the Catholic"" cannot be un-
derstood, particularly in the light of Fr.
Hanley's statement that "full freedom of
choice seems to me to involve the capacity
to choose more children, as well as less,
in situations where one is able to provide
for and educate children. '12 It is not seen
how this latter statement can be inter-
preted to apply solely to the Catholic
conscience. It shows, rather, the breadth
of the freedom of choice envisaged by
Fr. Hanley-a freedom of choice broad
enough to cover the choice of simply
having children or having more children,
a choice plainly not the concern solely
of Catholics nor related solely to the
Catholic moral teaching on contraception.
Mr. Ball, in his testimony before
Senator Gruening's subcommittee, sug-
9 This right could be argued to be guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. For example,
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932),
it was held that the amendment guaranteed the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring
up children...." Id. at 399. In referring
to this case, as well as others, Mr. Justice
White in his concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), stated that
"these decisions affirm that there is a 'realm
of family life which the state cannot enter'
without substantial justification." Id. at 502.
10 Ball, supra note 5, at 217.
11 Ibid.
12 Senate Hearings at 1276.
gested an analogy with the school prayer
cases to conclude that there would be
coercion in any publicly supported family-
planning program insofar as it affected
the poor. This analogy was based on his
interpretation of the school prayer cases
as being decided on the ground that there
was coercion of the children and thus an
infringement of their rights under the
free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. In my article, I urged that the
clear language of the school prayer cases
indicated they were decided on the basis
of the establishment clause and not the
free exercise clause, and hence I ques-
tioned the use of those cases as authori-
tatively supporting Mr. Ball's coercion
theory.13 Mr. Ball admitted in his reply
to my article that these cases were at
least formally decided on the basis of the
establishment clause, but he goes on to
argue that the Court found "establish-
ment" because there were children in-
volved.14  In other words, his position is
that in spite of the clear language used by
the Court, these cases would not have been
decided on the establishment clause if
there were no violation of the free exer-
cise clause through coercion of the
children. To justify this interpretation,
he draws a distinction between publicly
1" Sirilla, supra note 4, at 207, 208. Further-
more, in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963), the Court stated:
"Nor are these required exercises mitigated by
the fact that individual students may absent
themselves upon parental request, for that fact
furnishes no defense to a claim of uncon-
stitutionality under the Establishment Clause."
Such a statement would not be consistent with
an interpretation that the case was decided on
the basis of coercion and the free exercise
clause.
14 Ball, supra note 5, at 219.
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sponsored school prayers and publicly
sponsored praying in legislatures and
federal chaplaincies, stating:
It seems most unlikely that the Court
would declare publicly sponsored praying
in legislatures an unconstitutional prac-
tice. The federal chaplaincies go con-
stitutionally unchallenged. Who is
affected and in what situation appears to
be the key to the question of whether
there is an establishment of religion. 15
These questions of publicly sponsored
praying in legislatures and federal chap-
laincies have not been officially passed
upon by the Supreme Court, although in
his concurring opinion in the Engel case,"'
Mr. Justice Douglas considered the dis-
tinction between school prayer and praying
in Congress, suggested by Mr. Ball:
The fact that taxpayers do not have
standing in the federal courts to raise
the issue (Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447) is of course no justification for
drawing a line between what is done in
New York on one hand and on the other
what we do and what Congress does in
this matter of prayer.17
Mr. Justice Douglas indicates in the
same opinion that the principle would
be the same in both situations referred
to, irrespective of the question of coercion:
Yet for me the principle is the same,
no matter how briefly the prayer is said,
for in each of the instances given the
person praying is a public official on
the public payroll, performing a religious
exercise in a governmental institution.' s
Thus, the distinction suggested by Mr.
Ball to support his interpretation of the
school prayer cases would seem open to
1 id. at 219, 220.
'16Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
'L id. at 441.
18 Id. at 441.
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question. This is not to say that coercion
could not be constitutionally significant
in cases involving state or federal religious
activity. But, to say that it was deter-
minative in the school prayer cases, on
the basis of a distinction between them
and publicly sponsored praying in legisla-
tures and federal chaplaincies, would seem
to be a matter of speculation and con-
jecture at best.
Additionally, it should be noted that
school children ordinarily have ample
opportunities to pray and worship outside
of school time, and that by denying them
the opportunity to pray during school
hours, their constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion is not infringed.
This seems to have been the answer of
the Court in the Schempp case, 9 to the
contention that "the majority's right to
free exercise of religion"20 would require
that school prayer be permitted. In re-
jecting this contention, the Court recog-
nized the opportunity for worship at home
and in church, and its importance.2 Thus,
the children's constitutional right to free
exercise of religion was not unconstitu-
tionally impaired by the denial of public
prayer at school.
In its consideration of this point, the
Court also referred to, as a distinct ques-
tion, the use of government facilities and
personnel in connection with religious
practices for military personnel.22 Thus,
19 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
20Id. at 226.
21 Ibid.
2 2 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra
note 19. The Court noted the problems pre-
sented for military personnel: "Again, there
are such manifestations in our military forces,
where those of our citizens who are under the
the Court seems to be recognizing the
tension between the demands of the free
exercise clause and the establishment
clause in situations where the govern-
ment is responsible for conditions (e.g.,
military service) that deprive a person of
the usual and ordinary opportunities for
exercising his religion. And it would
then seem that the demands of the free
exercise clause can constitutionally re-
quire the federal government to provide
publicly supported facilities and personnel
for religious services on military bases
and the like. This would be a situation
where it could be said that the power,
prestige, and financial support of gov-
ernment are placed behind the practice of
religion. Yet the government's activity
can still be constitutionally justified, for
the reason, among others, that the de-
mands of the free exercise clause require
it since the government is responsible in
some way for the conditions that de-
prive military personnel of the usual and
ordinary opportunities for religious wor-
ship.
That government may constitutionally
act in this situation suggests a theory
for justifying the use of public funds to
support family-planning programs for the
poor. For example, it might be asked
restrictions of military service wish to engage
in voluntary worship." Id. at 213.
The Court continued: "We are not of course
presented with and therefore do not pass upon
a situation such as military service, where the
Government regulates the temporal and geo-
graphic environment of individuals to a point
that, unless it permits voluntary religious serv-
ices to be conducted with the use of govern-
ment facilities, military personnel would be
unable to engage in the practice of their faiths."
Id. at 226 n.10.
as to such programs, whether, given the
present circumstances in this country,
there might be some right on the part of
the poor requiring the government to
act in this area? Let us consider the
right of the poor to be free to make
their own decisions as to family size. If
this right is to be realizable, it would
seem to presuppose that the poor will
have a reasonable opportunity to carry
out their decisions as to family size, just
as the free exercise clause presupposes
a reasonable opportunity for religious
worship. Let us assume, for the sake of
argument, that the poor, and especially
those on public assistance (who often
have little education and extremely limit-
ed financial resources), really do not have
a reasonable opportunity at present to
carry out their decisions as to family size,
whether to limit family size, or to have
children in the case where there is some
temporary difficulty. To prove whether
or not this assumption is correct would
be beyond the scope of this paper. It
is being made only for the purpose of
the following analysis."
The next question would be whether
there may be some obligation requiring
the government to help the poor realize
or carry out their decisions as to family
size, when conditions in society are such
that, without such help, their decisions
as to family size could not be adequately
achieved. An analogy might be considered
23 It might be noted, however, that Dr. Milo
D. Leavitt, Jr., Deputy Secretary of the United
States Health, Education, and Welfare Depart-
ment, stated in an address to social workers
on November 29, 1966 in Kansas City, Missouri,
that: "We have five million indigent women
who desire family planning aid, but only a half
million now receive such aid."
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between this situation and the one where-
in government acts to provide facilities
and personnel to enable military person-
nel to realize their right to free exercise of
religion. The similarity would include
the fact that in each case, if government
did not act, the personal right in question-
could not be effectively exercised, and
that government is responsible in some
way for the conditions depriving the
people of the reasonable opportunity for
effectively exercising the right in question.
Admittedly, government may not have
acted directly to place the poor in their
disadvantaged positions, whereas there
may be direct government action in plac-
ing military servicemen in their stations
of duty. Yet, can it be said that govern-
ment has no responsibility regarding the
conditions in which the poor find them-
selves, and which inaction in fact may
have contributed to a greater or lesser
degree to their present state of financial,
educational, and cultural deprivation?
Might some theory be advanced, on the
basis of government responsibility, in
connection with the growing tendency to
recognize that the poor may have rights
(not just privileges) to receive public assist-
ance as to matters essential to their well-
being?24 And might these rights be broad-
24 This tendency is discussed in Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The author
states: "The concept of right is most urgently
needed with respect to benefits like . . . public
assistance. . . . These benefits are based upon
a recognition that misfortune and deprivation
are often caused by forces far beyond the con-
trol of the individual. . . . [I]n theory they
[such benefits] represent part of the individual's
rightful share in the commonwealth. Only by
making such benefits into rights can the wel-
fare state achieve its goal of providing a secure
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ened to include the right to receive educa-
tion and assistance in carrying out their
decisions as to family size? Family size
directly affects the well-being of the entire
family unit, and in fact might even be
argued to be a matter of such importance
for the well-being of the poor or impover-
ished family as to impose an obligation
on society to provide public assistance to
the poor to help them carry out their
decisions both as to the having of children
(when the couple might need medical and
professional help for this purpose), as
well as to limiting family size.
The Right of Privacy
As was the case with the right of the
poor to be free from coercion in their
decisions as to family size and method,
Mr. Ball's main objection regarding the
right of privacy of the poor in the inti-
mate details of their married life stems
from his fear or concern that family-
minimum basis for individual well-being and
dignity in a society where each man cannot
be wholly the master of his own destiny."
id. at 785-86.
See also tenBroek and Wilson, Public Assistance
and Social insurance-A Normative Evaluation,
1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 237 (1954). The authors
discuss the idea that an earned right is based
on productive work and suggest that society
has a duty to keep the path to the labor
market free of any socially created road
block. If society fails to do this, then those
who suffer have a right to receive assistance.
Id. at 248, 249. They further state: "Con-
siderable progress has been made also toward
establishing aid payments as a matter of right
under the public assistance programs. Some
courts have said that eligible clients have the
right to assistance." Id. at 247.
See also Jones, The Rule Of Law And The
Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154-55
(1958); Note, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963).
planning programs will necessarily be
directly connected with public welfare
programs giving economic assistance to
the poor. Such a connection would thus
provide the welfare caseworkers with
opportunities to put pressure on the poor
to limit family size, and to divulge infor-
mation, such as intimate matters of their
married life. As I indicated in my article,
serious constitutional questions would be
involved if such coercion and invasion of
privacy could not be adequately pro-
tected against. 25 In this connection, it is
agreed that family-planning programs
should be separated entirely from welfare
programs giving economic assistance. Fur-
thermore, it might be noted that the poor
who might be entitled to assistance in such
family-planning programs would not all
have to be on welfare. The poor of this
country are not coextensive with the
welfare rolls, and thus family-planning
programs limited to those on welfare
would not be available to all the poor
-another reason why they should not
be connected with welfare programs.
Presumably, Mr. Ball would have no
objection if the poor made free and
voluntary confidential disclosures as to
intimate details of married life, as needed
to carry out their decisions as to family
size and as to method, just as those who
can afford medical advice would make
similar disclosures in connection with
securing assistance to carry out their
decisions as to family size (large or
small), and as to method.
25 Sirilla, supra note 4, at 209.
Present State and Federal Activity,
and Need for Legislation
According to a recent estimate of the
Bureau of the Budget,2" the federal gov-
ernment has spent or plans to spend the
following sums on birth control and family
planning in fiscal years 1965, 1966, 1967:
in 1965-$2.3 million; in 1966-$14.7
million; and in 1967-$25.3 million.
These estimates include funds for re-
search and development as well as for
information, counseling and services. They
also include aid to foreign countries. If
we just consider the programs of the
Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, and the Department of the
Interior, and exclude research and develop-
ment, the estimates would be as follows:
in 1965-$439,000 (with no data avail-
able for the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare); in 1966-$6.3
million; and in 1967-$9.8 million.
According to a survey, conducted by
Senator Gruening's subcommittee, on
family-planning programs in all the states
and based on a 100 per cent response
from state governors and other officials,
it was determined that: twenty-one states
presently have state-operated family-plan-
ning programs; nine states have some
local government programs but no state
programs; seven more states are studying
a program or anticipate one in the near
future; four states only refer patients to
private physicians; only nine states have
26 This estimate appears in a Press Release,
dated Nov. 2, 1966, from the office of Senator
Gruening, and including copy of a letter dated
October 19, 1966 to Senator Gruening from
Phillip S. Hughes, Deputy Director of the
Bureau of the Budget.
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no state or local programs and no state
study underway; and the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa
and the Virgin Islands have centralized
programs.27
It will be apparent that there already
exists in this country substantial federal
and state activity in birth-control and
family-planning programs, and discussion
should not be confined, then, only as to
what government may or may not do
in the future, as though there has not
yet been any governmental activity in
this area. Whether or not there have
been any actual cases of coercion or in-
vasion of privacy in the administration
of present programs, it would seem that
in view of the increasing federal and
state activity in this area and out of con-
cern for the rights of the poor, it must
be asked: What should be done now to
be sure that the rights of the poor con-
sidered herein are properly protected?
Some of the possible alternatives would
include: (1) trying to form public opinion
to oppose all publicly supported family-
planning programs and leave the whole
problem to private clinics and institu-
tions; (2) relying on the good will of
the people who administer these public
programs, that they will not violate the
rights of the poor; (3) trying to institute
litigation to challenge the propriety of
such use of public funds, for example,
on the basis of actual cases of coercion
or invasion of privacy, if there are such,
in an effort to prevent such occurrences;
or, (4) trying to work out federal legisla-
tion to establish criteria for public pro-
grams and safeguards for the rights of
27Senate Hearings at 2015.
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the poor in the administration of such
programs.
As to the first alternative, it would be
a matter of conjecture whether present
public opinion could be swayed to such
an extent that it would force the federal and
the state agencies involved to discontinue
entirely their activity in this matter. In fact,
the increase in such activity over the past
few years would seem to indicate a lack
of any widespread public opinion oppos-
ing such measures. Furthermore, it would
seem open to serious question whether
private clinics and institutions would be
adequate, by themselves, to meet the
needs of the country.
As to the second alternative, this would
not seem preferable or acceptable for the
reason, among others, that it would not
prevent family-planning programs from
being tied in with the administration of
welfare programs. The possibility of
abuse in such situations, as noted above,
indicates that some provision should be
made for separation of the two types
of programs.
One of the difficulties with the third
alternative would be the question of stand-
ing to sue. As to the second part of
that alternative, it would be necessary
to find someone whose rights had actually
been violated, and who would be willing
to sue. If such an action could be prop-
erly developed, and if it were successful,
it conceivably could result in some pro-
nouncement limiting the present activities
of governmental agencies in the area of
family-planning. It is doubtful, however,
that any court would preclude, a priori,
the possibility of future valid legislation
in this area which more effectively pro-
tected the rights of the poor. Moreover,
litigation could not prevent the operation
of private birth-control clinics, and as
long as such private clinics exist, it could
be argued that overzealous welfare case-
workers might use the power of their
position, relative to the welfare recipient,
to force decisions on family limitation
against the latter's will.
Thus, if there is no legislation
in this area establishing criteria and
safeguards, it could be argued, as
Mr. Ball suggests, that the rights of
the poor on welfare, in matters of de-
cisions on family size, method, and marital
privacy, might rest in some cases on the
zeal or good will of their caseworkers. In
other words, even if there were no state or
federal activity regarding birth control,
but only private programs, there would
still be the possibility that welfare case-
workers might use their position and
influence to infringe upon the rights of
the poor on welfare, as by invading their
marital privacy or by coercing them to
use the services of private birth-control
clinics. With no specific federal legisla-
tion covering this subject, it would be
virtually impossible to protect against the
possibility of such individual abuses, or
to detect them and take appropriate action
if they should occur.
This would seem to present a reason
in favor of the fourth alternative
mentioned above, namely, trying to work
out federal legislation to establish criteria
for publicly supported family-planning
programs and safeguards for the rights
of the poor in the administration of such
programs. Fr. Hanley, in addressing him-
self to these problems, offered the follow-
ing suggestion:
(Continued on page 89)

 
